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I.
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS

The plaintiff, Idaho Counties Risk Management Program Underwriters (ICRMP),
filed its Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial on September 14, 2006. The Complaint
alleged damages for breach of contract surrounding the defendant, Northland Insurance
Companies (Northland}, refusal to perform its obligations pursuant to a policy of
reinsurance which was purchased by the plaintiff, ICRMP.

See R7-4.

Defendant

answered the Complaint October 20, 2006. See R72. Thereafter, on November 17,
2006, ICRMP filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. R80. Through this motion,
ICRMP sought to establish that pursuant to the policy of insurance ICRMP sold to its
insured, Kootenai County, that ICRMP was obligated to defend its insureds for claims
raised in the Paradis v. Kootenai County litigation. See R16-45, R80. See a/soR219,
Exhibit 12 (McHenry Affidavit, Exhibits 2 and 5). Northland responded to this motion on
December 12, 2006. See R26. On May 29, 2007, the District Court entered its order
granting ICRMP's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment following Northland's stipulation
recognizing its obligation to defend the Kootenai County insureds. Sec R187; TR12:813:7. The Court's Order states that ICRMP was obligated to provide a defense to its
insureds. See R187-188. Northland did not appeal the Order granting ICRMP's Motion
for Partial Summary Judgment.
On March 1, 2007, Northland filed its Motion for Summary Judgment. See R 109.
ICRMP responded April 23, 2007. See R 114. Oral arguments were held May 17, 2007.
See R5. On June 11, 2007, the District Court entered its Memorandum Decision and
Order granting the Northland Motion for Summary Judgment. See R190. Judgment was
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entered June 22, 2007. See R203. ICRMP filed a Notice of Appeal on July 3, 2007.
See R205.

II.
ISSUES ON APPEAL

1.

Whether the District Court erred when it granted the Northland Motion for

Summary Judgment concluding that Northland was not obligated to reimburse ICRMP
for monies paid to settle the Paradis v. Brady, et al litigation.
2.

Whether the District Court erred when it granted the Northland summary

judgment concluding that Northland was not obligated to reimburse or indemnify ICRMP
for monies spent to defend ICRMP's insureds in the Paradis v. Brady, et al litigation.

Ill.
STATEMENT OF FACTS

ICRMP was formed in 1985 pursuant to a joint powers agreement executed by
various governmental entities, including Kootenai County. See ROOS (Complaint, ,T\/1).
ICRMP sells casualty insurance to its members. Kootenai County has been a member
of ICRMP since 1985. It has, since that time, purchased casualty insurance from
•

,.,1

·"'·

,,,.

ICRMP. R009 (Complaint, ,T\/11). ICRMP has, from its inception including the 2000-2001
policy year, purchased reinsurance from Northland Insurance Companies and its
subsidiaries. R009 (Complaint, ,T\/111); R219, Exhibit 12 (Ferguson Affidavit, ,J2). By
purchasing reinsurance, ICRMP lowers its exposure for large losses which allows the
company to reduce the reserves it is required to maintain by the insurance code. See
R219, Exhibit 12 (Ferguson Affidavit, ,J2). By reinsuring and mitigating its risks, ICRMP
is able to sell other insurance policies and make investments. Id.
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On April 9, 2003, Donald Paradis filed a Complaint in the Federal District Court for
the State of Idaho against ICRMP's insureds Kootenai County, Glen Walker, Mark Haws,
Peter Erbland, and George Elliott. R009, Exhibit A. Upon receiving the Complaint from
Kootenai County, ICRMP immediately forwarded a copy to its reinsurer, Northland
Insurance Companies.

R219, Exhibit 12 (Ferguson Affidavit, 1f3).

ICRMP also

undertook an analysis of the allegations in the Paradis Complaint for potential coverage.
Through that process, ICRMP made the decision that a duty to defend existed.
Kootenai County and the individual defendants were advised a defense would be
provided subject to the exclusions and limitations in the ICRMP policy. ICRMP's position
relative to coverage was communicated in a reservation of rights letter.

R0010

(Complaint, ,rXII, Exhibit B). Northland was provided a copy of the reservation of rights
letter. Id. (Complaint, ,rXI; R219, Exhibit 2 (McHenry Affidavit, ,rs, Exhibit 3). Once
ICRMP made the decision to extend a defense to its insureds, it retained separate
attorneys for Kootenai County, Haws, Erbland, and Elliott. Northland was advised of this
decision and did not object to the decision by ICRMP that a duty to defend existed and
that separate attorneys were necessary to protect the interests of the ICRMP insureds .
.

.,

See R219, Exhibit 12 (Ferguson Affidavit, ,r5).

The litigation in the Paradis case went forward for the next two years. ICRMP
managed the litigation. During this time, Northland received regular reports from ICRMP
advising it of the status of the litigation, as well as the defense costs being incurred on
behalf of the ICRMP insureds. R219, Exhibit 12 (Ferguson Affidavit, ,I4). During this
time, the attorneys representing the ICRMP insureds challenged the Paradis complaint
through motions to dismiss. These motions sought the dismissal of the complaint on
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various grounds, including the timeliness of Mr. Paradi.s' Notice of Claim and the
applicable statute of limitations. On September 29, 2004, the Federal Court issued a
Memorandum Decision and Order denying, in part, the motions to dismiss. R219,
Exhibit 2 (McHenry Affidavit, 1)9, Exhibit 4). That Order concluded that certain claims
were not time barred because they described continuing torts and continuous tortuous
activity during the time Mr. Paradis was incarcerated. Id. (McHenry Affidavit, Exhibit 4,
pp. 42-45). Northland was provided a copy of the District Court's ruling. The Federal
Court also instructed Mr. Paradis to file an Amended Complaint clarifying a number of
his claims. Id. (Memorandum Decision and Order, pp. 48-49). The First Amended
Complaint was filed June 6, 2005. R219, Exhibit 2 (McHenry Affidavit, 1)10, Exhibit 5).
After the Amended Complaint was filed, ICRMP again examined the factual and legal
claims alleged in the Amended Complaint for potential coverage.

Again, ICRMP

reached the conclusion that a duty to defend existed. ICRMP continued to defend its
insureds pursuant to the prior reservation of rights. R219, Exhibit 2 (McHenry Affidavit,
1)1]10 and 11 ).
On February 13, 2006, Northland, for the first time, advised ICRMP that it felt

.,

coverage did not exist for any of the claims described in the Paradis Complaints. See
R0011 (Complaint, 1]XVI, Exhibit C). In its correspondence to ICRMP, Northland took
the position that coverage did not exist as Mr. Paradis' complaints did not arise from an
occurrence that took place during the time Northland provided insurance to ICRMP.
Alternatively, Northland contended the Paradis complaints involved actions that were
expected or intended from the standpoint of Kootenai County or its employees. See
R0057. Correspondence was exchanged between ICRMP and Northland addressing
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the coverage issues.

See R0060-65.

Through those discussions, Northland was

reminded that the federal judge assigned to the Paradis liability case had issued rulings
characterizing a number of the Paradis claims as continuing torts. Based upon those
rulings, it was ICRMP's position at that time, that the existence of continuing torts
describing negligence, false arrest, and false imprisonment described potentially covered
claims which obligated ICRMP to provide a defense and which would trigger North land's
obligation to reimburse ICRMP for those defense costs. See R0060-62. Northland
summarily dismissed the legal reasoning of Judge Winmill concluding that a continuing
tort did not exist and, for that reason, coverage would not arise. R0064-65.
After Northland made the decision to deny coverage, the ongoing and increasing
defense costs associated with the litigation in addition to the potential financial exposure
to the ICRMP insureds caused ICRMP to consider the possibility of mediating a
settlement. See R219, Exhibit 12 (Ferguson Affidavit, 1]8). At that point, the defense
costs had reached approximately $400,000., exceeding the self-retention of ICRMP
under the Northland/Northfield reinsurance policy. It was anticipated that throughout the
Paradis trial the defense costs, which would include expenses relating to expert
witnesses, would exceed $2 million. In light of the anticipated defense costs, coupled
with the possibility of an adverse judgment being entered against its insureds, ICRMP
made the decision that mediation should be pursued. Id. (Ferguson Affidavit, 1]9).
Although Northland had already breached the reinsurance policy thereby discharging
ICRMP from any obligation to continue providing reports of the ongoing litigation, ICRMP
solicited Northland's input regarding the decision to seek mediation and invited its
participation in settlement discussions.

See R0011 (Complaint, 1]XVIII, Exhibit F).
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Northland rejected this invitation by restating its previous position that coverage did not
exist. It advised ICRMP that it would not participate in mediation or settlement. Id.
(Complaint, Exhibit G).
Thereafter, the case was mediated and a favorable settlement was reached.
R219, Exhibit 12 (Ferguson Affidavit, 1)11 ). The settlement required ICRMP to pay
$800,000, which was less than the anticipated cost to litigate the case through trial. Id.
(Ferguson Affidavit, 1)1)9 and 11). The settlement also extinguished the ICRMP insureds'
exposure to a claim for attorney fees from the attorneys who had represented Mr.
Paradis throughout the habeas corpus litigation. The potential exposure for that aspect
of the case alone exceeded $2.5 million. Id. (Ferguson Affidavit, 1)12, Exhibits 1 and 2).

IV.

ARGUMENT
The Memorandum Decision and Order entered by the District Court reached the
ultimate conclusion that the insurance policy which ICRMP purchased from Northland
through its subsidiary, Northfield, did not afford coverage for any claims described in the
liability complaints filed by Donald Paradis against ICRMP's insureds, Kootenai County,
'

Mark Haws, George Elliott, Peter Erbland, and Glen Walker. In reaching this conclusion,
the District Court ruled there was no coverage and no duty on the part of Northland to
indemnify ICRMP for any defense or settlement costs.

R202. As outlined in the

sections below, the District Court's ruling is legally flawed for a number of reasons. The
Court failed to apply the language in the Northfield policy that required it to indemnify its
assured, ICRMP, for "all sums including expenses" which ICRMP became legally
obligated to pay". R219, Exhibit 4 (Martens Affidavit., Exhibit A, p. 13). The Court failed
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to recognize the fact ICRMP incurred expenses, i.e. defense costs, on behalf of its
insureds because, based upon the allegations in the liability complaints and the
coverages afforded in the ICRMP policy it was undisputed ICRMP was "legally obligated"
to provide a defense. This caused the Court to treat an insurance company's duty to
defend as being the same as its duty to indemnify when, in fact, the duty to defend is a
separate and much broader obligation. These errors caused the District Court to
conclude that a duty to defend did not arise under the Northfield policy when its focus
should have been whether a duty to defend existed under the ICRMP policy. The
District Court failed to consider the fact that it had previously ruled that ICRMP was,
under the terms of the ICRMP policy, legally obligated to defend its insureds.
The District Court's errors were the product of its failure to recognize the
contractual relationship between Northland and ICRMP and the fact that Northfield
described its relationship with ICRMP as a policy of reinsurance which required the
ICRMP claims department to make all decisions concerning the investigation, defense,
and settlement of all claims under the Northfield Policy. R219, Exhibit 4 (Martens
Affidavit, Exhibit A, p. 5). The language in the Northfield policy did not allow Northland or
Northfield the ability to override the decisions of ICRMP to defend a case or enter into
good faith settlement. Finally, the District Court failed to consider Northland's obligation
to reimburse ICRMP for the settlement monies paid to resolve the Paradis litigation after
Northland breached its contract with ICRMP by refusing to acknowledge the existence of
a duty to defend and refusing to indemnify ICRMP for the expenses being incurred and
then refuse to participate in settlement discussions or mediation.

A.

The District Court Failed to Consider the Language in the
Northfield Insurance Policy Which Required ICRMP to Make
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Decisions Concerning Whether to Defend the Paradis Complaints.

The Memorandum Decision and Order issued by the District Court failed to
consider the contractual relationship between ICRMP and Northland and, by doing so,
failed to recognize that ICRMP was legally obligated under the terms of the Northfield
policy to make all decisions concerning whether a duty to defend existed. Northland
could not, two years later, unilaterally decide to deny coverage. This caused the District
Court to improperly conclude Northland was not required to indemnify ICRMP in
accordance with the terms of the reinsurance policy.
From the time ICRMP was formed in 1985, it has purchased reinsurance from
Northland. See R9. See also R219, Exhibit 12 (Ferguson Affidavit, 1]4), Exhibit 4,
(Martins Affidavit, 1]12).1 In 2000-2001, the policy was issued by North land's subsidiary,
Northfield Insurance Company. The Northfield policy identifies the "named reinsured" as
ICRMP. The policy reads:

NAMED REINSURED:
ICRMP COUNTIES RISK
MANAGEMENT RISK PROGRAM, A JOINT POWERS
AUTHORITY, and all Boards, Departments, Divisions,
Commissions, Authorities, and any other activities under the
supervision or control of the J.P.A., whether now or
hereafter constituted.
·'
See R219, Exhibit 4, (Martens Affidavit, Exhibit A, Northfield Policy, p. 1).
The policy extends various coverages, including comprehensive general liability
and how law enforcement liability (Section II) and errors and omissions coverage
(Section IV). The insuring agreement under the general liability section of the policy
reads:

1 According to Northland, its records indicate that insurance policies were sold to ICRMP
from 1986 to 1988 and from 1994 through 2001.
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A. COMPREHENSIVE GENERAL LIABILITY: Underwriters
hereby agree, subject to the limitations, terms and
conditions hereunder mentioned, to indemnify the Assured
for all sums, including expenses, as more fully defined by
the term ultimate net loss, which the Assured shall become
legally obligated to pay as damages imposed by law
because of bodily injury, property damage, personal injury,
advertising injury, products liability and/or completed
operations, hosts/liquor liability or incidental malpractice
which result from an occurrence and which occur during the
policy period. (emphasis added)

C.
LAW ENFORCEMENT LIABILITY: Underwriters
hereby agree, subject to the limitations, terms and
conditions hereunder mentioned, to indemnify the Assured
for all sums which the Assured shall be obligated to pay by
reason of errors, omissions or negligent acts arising out of
the performance of the Assured's duties while acting as a
law enforcement official or officer in the regular course of
public employment as hereinafter defined, arising out of any
occurrence from any cause on account of Personal Injury,
Bodily Injury, Property Damage, Violation of Civil Rights or
First Aid, happening during the period of this insurance
except as covered under Section II A and B.
Notwithstanding Insuring Agreements A, B and C above
Underwriters shall not be liable to indemnify the Assured for
any sum which the assured shall be obligated to pay if a
judgment or final adjudication in any action brought against
the Assured shall be based on a deterrnination that acts of
fraud or dishonesty were committed by the Assured.

See R196. See also R219, Exhibit 4 (Martens Affidavit, Exhibit A, p. 13) (emphasis
added).
The Northfield policy identifies the ICRMP claims department as the entity
charged with the responsibility of making decisions relating to the defense and
settlement of all claims. The policy language reads:
It is understood that all claims under this policy shall be
serviced by ICRMP's Claims Department who shall perform
the following duties:
APPELLANT IDAHO COUNTIES RISK MANAGEMENT PROGRAM UNDERWRITER'S
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a) Investigate and settle or defend all claims or losses - it is
understood that when so requested, the ICRMP Claims
Department will afford underwriters an opportunity to be
associated with them in the defense or control of any claim,
suit, or proceeding.
Id. (Northfield Policy, p. 5) (emphasis added).

Reviewing this language, the duties and powers given to ICRMP to make
decisions concerning the application of the Northfield policy are broad and mandatory.
The policy language requires the ICRMP claims department to make all decisions
regarding the defense and settlement of claims.

While Northfield is given the

"opportunity to be associated", the policy does not give Northfield or Northland the right
to override or second-guess ICRMP's good faith claims management decisions which
would include the decision to provide a defense and how the defense would be
conducted. This language unambiguously empowers the ICRMP claims department to
bind Northfield and Northland on issues concerning the defense and settlement of
claims.
It is generally recognized that reinsurance contracts may contain clauses which
provide that claims involving the reinsurance, ,when s@ttled J::,y the reinsured, shall be
binding on the reinsurer. These clauses are known as "follow the settlements" or "follow
the fortunes" clauses. See North River Ins. Co. v. ACE American Reinsurance Co.,
361 F3d. 134, 142 (2 nd Cir. 2004). Where there is concurrency of coverage between the
ceding company's policy and the policy of reinsurance, the follow the settlements
doctrine imposes upon the reinsurer a contractual obligation to indemnify the ceding
company for payments it makes pursuant to a loss settlement under its own policy,
provided that such settlement is not fraudulent, collusive, or otherwise made in bad faith.
APPELLANT IDAHO COUNTIES RISK MANAGEMENT PROGRAM UNDERWRITER'S
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See Aetna Casualty & Surety Ins. Co. v. Home Ins. Co., 882 F. Supp. 1328, 1346
(S.D. N.Y. 1995). In this case, the Northfield policy included a claims settlement clause
which required its reinsured, ICRMP, to make all decisions concerning the defense and
settlement of claims. The language in the Northfield policy, although it does not use the
terms "follow the settlements" or "follow the fortunes", obligates Northfield to honor the
good faith decisions made by ICRMP regarding the handling of claims which would
include extending a defense and settlement.
The reimbursement of expenses and settlement monies is described in the
Northfield policy as a component of the "ultimate net loss".

These payments are

qualified by ICRMP's self-insured retention of $150,000. See R219, Exhibit 4 (Martens
Affidavit, Exhibit A, Northfield Policy, p. 3). The term "ultimate net loss" is defined in the
Northfield policy and includes the "total sum" ICRMP becomes obligated to pay by
reason of personal injury or property damage claims either through adjudication or
compromise. The definition recognizes the "total sum" owed by Northfield would include
salaries, wages, law costs, expenses for lawyers and investigators, or other persons for
litigation, settlement, adjustment, and investigations of claims or suits. Id. (Northfield
,,;;,;-:,

Policy, p. 40, 1]17).

As part of its duties to manage claims, the ICRMP claims

department is required to furnish monthly claim reports to Northfield. Id. (Northfield
policy, p. 5, 1]11, C). Northfield is then required to promptly reimburse ICRMP for any and
all payments made in excess of the SIR. Id. (Northfield Policy, p. 39, 1]9).
ICRMP clearly fulfilled its contractual obligations to Northland. When the Paradis
complaints were first received, Northland was notified and provided copies of the
pleadings. R219, Exhibit 12 (Ferguson Affidavit, 1]4). Northland was provided regular

APPELLANT IDAHO COUNTIES RISK MANAGEMENT PROGRAM UNDERWRITER'S
OPENING BRIEF - 11

claim reports advising it of the status of the litigation. These reports included updates of
the defense costs that were being incurred. Id. Northland never objected to the ongoing
defense costs, nor did it object to the case management decisions that were being made
by the ICRMP claims department. Id. (Ferguson Affidavit, ,T1]4 and 5). More important,
Northland never objected to the decision to provide a defense to the ICRMP insureds.
The defense efforts continued without any feedback from Northland for nearly two years.
On February 13, 2006, Northland, for the first time, communicated its position that
coverage did not exist for the Paradis complaints. Id. (Ferguson Affidavit, 1]6).
In the proceedings before the District Court, Northland argued the policies it sold
to ICRMP were not reinsurance, but, instead, were reimbursement policies. See R 191,
012. What Northland accomplished by this argument is the identification of ambiguities
in the Northfield policy which establishes the error in the District Court's rulings.
At the first page of the policy, ICRMP is described as Northfield's "named
reinsured". This characterization alone is inconsistent with Northland's argument that it
did not sell lCRMP a reinsurance policy. Like other reinsurance policies, the Northfield
policy extends the same coverages as the primary policy by utilizing similar, if not
identical, insuring language and definitions as those which exist in the ICRMP policy.
See Section IV.C, infra.2 Additionally, and most important, the Northfield policy requires

2 Many reinsurance contracts use policy language to assure the coverages in the liability
and the reinsurance policies are similar. This language is referred to as a "follow the
forms" clause. The purpose of such language is to achieve "concurrency". A follow the
form clause assures consistency and "concurrency" between the primary policy and the
reinsurance contract. The reinsurance contract is construed as insuring the same risks
and offering the same scope of coverage as the reinsured policy. See AETNA Casualty
& Surety v. Home Ins. Co., 833 F. Supp. 1328, 1337 (S.D. NY 1995). Here, ICRMP
and Northland achieved concurrency by utilizing similar if not identical policy language.
In other words, the Northland policy covers the same risks, under the same terms, as the
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the ICRMP claims department to make all decisions concerning the investigation, the
defense, or settlement of claims. Northfield is not allowed, under the language of its own
policy, to second-guess or override ICRMP's good faith claims handling decisions. See
R219, Exhibit 4 (Martens Affidavit, Exhibit A, Northfield Policy, p. 5, 1111). Through this
language, Northfield required ICRMP to investigate the Paradis complaints and make
decisions concerning whether it was obligated to provide a defense. It is undisputed
ICRMP fulfilled this obligation and informed the Kootenai County insureds that while the

Paradis complaints included allegations that would not be entitled to coverage,
allegations had been advanced which described potentially covered claims. For that
reason, the insureds were advised, in writing, that ICRMP would provide a defense but
was reserving its right to deny coverage for non-covered claims. See R219, Exhibit 2
(McHenry Affidavit, 1TB, Exhibit 3). A copy of the reservation of rights letter sent to
Kootenai County stating ICRMP's coverage position was forwarded to Northland
Insurance Companies. Id. Northland never voiced any concern or objection to ICRMP's
decision to extend a defense under both the ICRMP and Northfield policies until two
years after the litigation had been ongoing. Northland's actions were inconsistent with
:::..:"

the language of the Northfield policy which requires the ICRMP claims department to
service all claims and make decisions concerning whether to "investigate and settle or
defend all claims or losses". See R219, Exhibit 4 (Martens Affidavit, Exhibit A, Northfield
Policy, p. 5). A decision to "defend" clearly encompasses the determination of whether a
duty to defend was owed.
If Northland had desired to reserve the right to override ICRMP's claims decisions

ICRMP policy.
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it could have included language creating that right in the policy. See American Nat'/
Fire Ins. Co. v. B&L Trucking and Const. Co., 134 Wn2d. 413, 951 P2d. 250 (1998)

(rejecting an insurer's argument that it should be allowed to apportion damages that
were caused by a single occurrence which spanned a number of years based upon the
length of time it insured the risk. Court reasoned the insurer could have included an
allocation clause in its policy and its failure to do so foreclosed its ability to lessen its
obligation to the insured through apportionment). This Court has always held that it will
not rewrite contracts or, through interpretation, include terms which the parties did not
include in their agreement. See J.R. Simplot Co. v. Chambers, 71 Idaho 248, 229
P2d. 977 (1960) (courts cannot interpret an agreement to mean something which it does
not itself contain); Shawyerv. Huckleberry Estates, LLC, 140 Idaho 354,361, 93 P3d.
685, 692 (2004) (courts do not possess roving power to rewrite contracts in order to
make them more equitable); Cresto Viene Pentecostal Church v. Paz,_ Idaho_,
160 P3d. 743 (2007) (courts do not possess roving power to rewrite contracts in orderto
make them more equitable). Here, Northland's failure to reserve the right to contest
ICRMP's decision to extend coverage cannot be cured through litigation. Northland is
"'

,,-?

1.·

bound by the terms of the Northfield policy and was bound by ICRMP's decision that the
Kootenai County insureds were entitled to a defense.
The contractual relationship between ICRMP and Northland, as described in the
Northfield insurance policy, is a reinsurance relationship. Generally, reinsurance is a
contractual arrangement whereby one insurer transfers all or a portion of the risk it
underwrites by purchasing an insurance policy from another insurer. See Colonial
American Life Ins. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 491 U.S. 244 (19.89). The

APPELLANT IDAHO COUNTIES RISK MANAGEMENT PROGRAM UNDERWRITER'S
OPENING BRIEF - 14

purpose of reinsurance is its function as a mechanism for the reallocation of risk from the
insurer that originally underwrites a risk to another insurer. Kemper Reinsurance Co. v.
Corcoran (in re: Midland Ins. Co.), 79 NY2d. 253, 590 NE2d. 1186 (1992). The
availability of reinsurance allows an insurer to accept risks that would otherwise be
beyond its underwriting capacity by allowing it to "lay off' on a reinsurer, a portion of that
risk. Reinsurance allows insurers to spread the risk of catastrophic losses among a
larger pool of insurers. See Excess and Casualty Reinsurance Assoc. v. Insurance
Commissioner of California, 656 F2d. 491 (9th Cir. 1991).
Under an indemnity reinsurance agreement, once the ceding insurer pays a claim,
the reinsurer becomes obligated to indemnify the ceding insurer in accordance with the
reinsurance contract. See China Union Lines, Ltd. v. American Marine Underwriters,
Inc., 755 F2d. 26 (2

nd

Cir. 1985). The re insurer is not obligated to pay for losses that are

not covered by the underlying policy. See American Ins. Co. v. North American Co.
for Property & Casualty Ins., 697 F2d. 79 (2

nd

Cir. 1982). However, a reinsurer cannot

second-guess the good faith liability determinations made by its reinsured or the
reinsured's good faith decision to waive liability defenses to which it may be entitled .
. ,_,

-~

.·:

Christiania General Ins. Corp. v. Great American Ins. Co., 979 F2d. 268 (2 nd Cir.
1992).
Applying these principles to the present litigation reveals the error that was made
by the District Court. The Northfield policy is an indemnity reinsurance contract. As a
reinsurer, Northfield was obligated to reimburse ICRMP in accordance with the terms
and conditions of the Northfield policy. While Northfield was not obligated to pay claims
which would not have been otherwise covered by the ICRMP policy, the ICRMP claims
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department was specifically identified in the Northfield policy as the entity charged with
the responsibility for making decisions concerning the investigation, defense, and
settlement of claims. R219, Exhibit 4 (Martens Affidavit, Exhibit 4, p. 5). Under the
terms of the Northfield policy, Northland was bound by ICRMP's determination that a
duty to defend was triggered by the Paradis complaints. Northland cannot argue that
ICRMP was not required to defend the Paradis complaints in light of the Order granting
ICRMP's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. Northland waived that right when it
stipulated to ICRMP's motion.

See TR12:8-13:7. ICRMP was legally obligated to

provide a defense and, under the terms of the reinsurance contract, Northfield was
required to reimburse ICRMP for those costs.
To the extent Northland takes the position that it was not ICRMP's reinsurer,
clearly the Northfield policy is capable of more than one interpretation which, as a matter
of law, renders it ambiguous. See Purdy v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Idaho, 138 Idaho 443,
65

P3d.

184 (2003).

Any ambiguity must be

strictly construed

against

Northland/Northfield and in favor of the assured, ICRMP. See Farmers Ins. Co. v.
Talbot, 133 Idaho 428, 987 P2d. 1043 (1999); Foremost Ins. Co. v. Putzier, 102 Idaho
,s

138, 627 P2d. 317 (1981). Here, for the reasons outlined above, the Northfield policy
should be treated as an indemnity reinsurance policy.

As will be outlined below,

Northfield and Northland clearly breached the policy and is obligated to reimburse
ICRMP for defense costs associated with the Paradis litigation, as well as the settlement
that was ultimately negotiated.

B.

The District Court Applied an Erroneous Legal Standard to the
Question of Whether the ICRMP Insureds Were Entitled to a
Defense in the Paradis Litigation
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Notably absent in the District Court's Memorandum Decision and Order is any
discussion of the fact ICRMP, through its claims department, was required by the
Northfield policy to decide whether to provide a defense to its insureds for the Paradis
complaints.

The District Court should have recognized this aspect of the parties'

contractual relationship and focused its analysis upon whether ICRMP's decision to
provide its insureds a defense was made in good faith. As outlined in §IV.A, supra, in
the absence of facts establishing ICRMP was acting in bad faith or some other
inappropriate manner, Northfield was bound by the good faith claims decisions made by
ICRMP's claims department. A review of the appropriate standards for determining
whether a duty to defend existed reveals that ICRMP's decisions were not only made in
good faith, they were legally correct.
In its Memorandum Decision and Order, the District Court mistakenly viewed the
controlling legal issue governing the question of whether a duty to defend existed to be
whether an "occurrence" took place during the time ICRMP was insured by Northland.
R195. The Court also concluded the applicable insurance policy was the 2000-2001
policy .3 Id. Explaining the timing of when the occurrence took place, the District Court
held "Of central focus is when did the tortuous conduct 'occur' for purposes of insurance
coverage?" R197. The Court then reasoned:
In order for the Court to establish whether there was an
occurrence within the policy, as such, the Court must first,
3 This case involves a series of acts which triggered policies over many years. Once a
policy is triggered, the insurers are jointly and severally liable for the overall risk. See
Keene v. Ins. Co. of North Am., 667 F2d. 1034 (D.C. Cir. 1981) cert denied 455 U.S.
1007 (1982). When more than one policy is triggered, the policyholder may select the
policy under which it desires to be indemnified. Id. at 1049-50. Here, the chosen policy
was 2000-2001. However, all ICRMP policies sold to Kootenai County back to 1985
were triggered by the allegations in the Paradis liability complaints.
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identify the occurrence and then, determine when it took
place. Generally, an occurrence is determined by the cause
of causes of the tortuous conduct. That is, the Court is to
determine if there was "but one proximate, uninterrupted,
and continuing cause which resulted in all of the injuries and
damage." Appalachian Ins. Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co.,
rd
676 F2d. 56, 61 (3 Cir. 1982) (citations omitted). In
applying this test, the Court finds that there was only one
proximate cause for the wrongful imprisonment of Mr.
Paradis and the damages that resulted from it; the failure to
make the Brady disclosures and therefore, the failure to
train properly regarding the Brady disclosures. It was this
failure that caused the errors that lead to the wrongful
imprisonment in Idaho and the resulting infliction of
emotional distress claims. Had the Brady training occurred,
the exculpatory evidence should have been disclosed
preventing the imprisonment of Mr. Paradis in Idaho and,
accordingly, his emotional distress claims. For that reason,
the Court views the occurrence as being the failure to train
regarding the Brady requirements.
See R198.
This reasoning caused the Court to rule that there was no occurrence and" ... no duty to
indemnify for either the settlement or the defense costs." R202.
The District Court erred by failing to recognize the well-established proposition
that an insurer's duty to defend is a separate and much broader than its obligation to
indemnify. See City of Idaho Falls v. Home lndemrlity Co., 126 Idaho 404, 888 P2d.
383 (1995); Hirst v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 106 Idaho 792, 683 P2d. 440 (Ct.
App. 1984). In Kootenai County v. Western Casualty & Surety Co., 113 Idaho 908,
750 P2d. 87 (1988), this Court described when an insurer's duty to defend arises by
writing:
[T]he duty to defend arises upon the filing of a Complaint
whose allegations, in whole or in part, read broadly, reveals
a potential for liability that would be covered by the insured's
policy.
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Id at 910 (emphasis in original).
This Court has also recognized that the duty to defend does not depend upon an
evaluation of potential factual or legal defenses, such as proximate cause. Instead, the
duty to defend is determined by examining the facts and legal theories which are pied in
the liability complaint upon which the insured's request for coverage is based. See
lntermountain Gas Co. v. Industrial Indemnity Co. of Idaho, 125 Idaho 182,868 P2d.

51 O (1994) (the duty to defend is defined by the scope of the claims, not their validity);
Hirst v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., supra (holding that an insured must look at the

full breadth of the plaintiff's claim in order to determine if a duty to defend exists).
In Construction Management Systems, Inc. v. Assurance Co. of America,
135 Idaho 680, 23 P3d. 142 (2001), the Court recognized that any doubt regarding
whether a defense is owed must be resolved in the favor of the insured by writing:
An insurer seeking to establish that it has no duty to defend
confronts a difficult burden since, at this stage, any doubts
as to coverage must be resolved in favor of the insured.
Id. at 683.
The Court rejected the argument that an insurer may look beyond the words in the
;._·'

;.-

.·/

complaint to determine whether a possibility of coverage existed. Id. at 684. This point,
and the legal analysis for determining whether the duty to defend exists was further
explained in Hoyle v. Utica Mut. Ins. Co., 137 Idaho 367, 48 P3d. 1256 (2002) where
the Court held that the determination of the existence of a duty to defend rests solely
upon an examination of allegations in the third party's complaint. The Court specifically
ruled that extrinsic facts which might create or defeat coverage are irrelevant to this
inquiry. See 137 Idaho at 373-75. See also Aamco Ins. Co. v. Tri-Spur Investment
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Co., 140 Idaho 733, 100 P3d. 226 (2004). If the plaintiff's allegations, read broadly,

reveals a potential for coverage, the insurer is obligated to defend the case.
Conspicuously absent in the District Court's Memorandum Decision and Order is
any discussion or factual analysis of the allegations contained in the Paradis complaints
or a comparison of those allegations against coverages described in the ICRMP or
Northfield policies. Ignoring the allegations in the liability complaints, the Court made a
factual finding that, as a matter of law, only one proximate cause could exist for the
wrongful imprisonment of Mr. Paradis and the subsequent emotional distress he
allegedly suffered. See R198. The District Court committed legal error by resolving
disputed issues of fact concerning proximate cause through summary judgment. See
Annau v. Schutte, 96 Idaho 704,707,535 P2d. 1095, 1098 (1975) (generally, issues of

proximate cause are jury questions unless the proof in the record is so clear that
different minds cannot reasonably draw different conclusions or where all reasonable
minds would construe the facts in only one way.)
Contrary to the approach taken by the District Court, trial courts are not allowed to
engage in a factual analysis of the proximate cause of the third party plaintiff's alleged

..

damages for purposes of defeating an insured's entitlement to a defense. Otherwise,
trial courts would be encouraged to consider extrinsic facts that are not pied in the
liability complaint to determine whether an insured is entitled to a defense.

This

approach is inconsistent with this Court's rulings in Hoyle, 137 Idaho at 373-37 4, and
Aamco Ins. Co., 140 Idaho at 231-232.

The legal error committed by the District Court was its failure to analyze the
question of whether a duty to defend arose th rough a comparison of the factual and legal
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allegations pied in the Paradis liability complaints against the coverages afforded by the
ICRMP policy.

As outlined in §IV.C.2, infra, that process reveals, contrary to the

proximate cause conclusions reached by the District Court, the Paradis complaints
allege ongoing tortuous activity which began when Paradis was initially arrested and
continued for the next 20 years while he was incarcerated. The Paradis complaints do
not allege a single act of failing to train on the part of Kootenai County caused him to
suffer damages for the next 20 years. Instead, the Paradis complaints allege ongoing
tortuous conduct which, separate from the activities that surrounded his arrest and
conviction, caused him to suffer damages.

These allegations describe potentially

covered claims.
The District Court should have recognized the reinsurance relationship that
existed between ICRMP and Northland. If it had proceeded in this fashion, its inquiry
would have focused upon whether the ICRMP claims department fulfilled its obligations
under the Northfield policy by making a good faith determination that the ICRMP
insureds were owed a defense.

That process would have involved the standards

outlined by this Court in Hoyle v. Utica Mut. Inc. Co., supra. If the decision to extend
.. ·/

the defense Was made in good faith, Northland was bound by that decision and is
required to indemnify ICRMP as provided by the Northfield policy. A review of the
allegations in the Paradis liability complaints reveals not only was ICRMP's decision to
extend a defense done in good faith, the company's decision was mandated under the
legal standards this Court has created for examining when a duty to defend would arise
to defend.
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C.

THE ALLEGATIONS IN THE PARADIS COMPLAINTS
DESCRIBE POTENTIALLY COVERED CLAIMS WHICH REQUIRED
ICRMP TO PROVIDE A DEFENSE.
The ICRMP policy at Section II (Comprehensive General Liability Insurance)

provides coverage for general liability claims, as well as law enforcement liability. See
R219, Exhibit 2 (McHenry Affidavit, Exhibit 1, p. 14). The general liability coverage
requires the insurer to defend and indemnify for claims causing damages arising from an
occurrence which causes "bodily injury" or "property damage" as those terms are defined
in the policy. The law enforcement liability section insures for "errors, omission, or
negligent acts", arising out of the performance of law enforcement services resulting in
"personal injury" during the policy period. Id.
The insuring language in the comprehensive general liability section of the
Northfield policy is nearly identical to the ICRMP policy. See R219, Exhibit 4 (Martens
Affidavit, Exhibit A, p. 13). The policy requires Northfield to indemnify its "assured",
ICRMP, for claims which ICRMP becomes "legally obligated to pay" because of"bodily
injury", or "personal injury" caused by an occurrence which occurs during the policy
·'

period. Id. The law enforcement liability coverage requires Northfield to indemnify
ICRMP for "all sums which the Assured shall be obligated to pay by reason for errors
and omissions or negligent acts" relating to duties of a law enforcement official which
cause "personal injury", "bodily injury", or "violation of civil rights". Id.
The ICRMP and Northfield policies contain nearly identical definitions of the
important term "personal injury". See R219, Exhibits 2 and 4 (McHenry Affidavit, Exhibit
1; ICRMP Policy, p. 15, ,J9; Martens Affidavit, Exhibit 4; Northfield Policy, p. 14, ,i1 ).
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Both definitions extend coverage for mental anguish or shock, malicious prosecution,
libel, slander or defamation of character.4
Finally, the ICRMP and Northfield policies define the term "occurrence" using
nearly identical language. The Northfield policy reads:
For Section II, "occurrence" means an accident or a
happening or event or a continuous or repeated exposure to
conditions which result in personal injury or damage to
property during the policy period. All personal injuries to one
or more persons and/or property damage arising out of an
accident or a happening or event or a continuous or
repeated exposure to conditions shall be deemed to be one
occurrence.
R219, Exhibit 4 (Martens Affidavit, Exhibit A, p. 6) (emphasis added).
The only difference between the ICRMP and Northfield definitions is the inclusion of the
phrase "or happening or event" in the Northfield definition.

See R219, Exhibit 2

(McHenry Affidavit, Exhibit 1, p. 14, ,18).
Reviewing the language in the ICRMP and Northfield policies reveals that the
reinsurance contract issued by Northfield did not create a more restrictive coverage
under its general liability and law enforcement liability sections than the coverages which
ICRMP inciuded in the,insurance policy sold to its insureds, including Kootenai County.
If coverage existed under the ICRMP policy, those covered claims were reinsured by the
Northfield policy.
In the summary judgment proceedings, the District Court granted ICRMP's Motion
for Partial Summary Judgment by issuing an Order stating:

4 The ICRMP definition also includes violations of civil rights. R219, Exhibit 2 (McHenry
Affidavit, Exhibit 1, p. 15, ,19). The Northfield policy provides coverage for civil rights
violations in the insuring language that describes its coverage for law enforcement
liability. R219, Exhibit 4 (Martens Affidavit, Exhibit A, p. 13, ,JC).
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That ICRMP was obligated, pursuant to the policy of
insurance it sold to Kootenai County, to provide a defense to
its insureds for the lawsuit filed by Donald Paradis filed in
the Federal Court for the District of Idaho described as
Paradis v. Brady, eta/, Case No. CIV-03-01-50-N-BLW; ... "
R187-188.
This Order became final when the District Court entered the Judgment on June
22, 2007. R203. The Order granting ICRMP's motion has never been challenged by
Northland and was not appealed to this Court. Therefore, the ruling that ICRMP was
required to defend the Paradis lawsuit cannot be challenged through this appeal. See
JAR 11 (g); Williamson v. Ysura, 78 Idaho 423, 305 P2d. 732 (1956) (when a case is not
appealed from the judgment, the orders made prior to judgment that could have been
reviewed on appeal become final). Additionally, counsel for Northland stipulated to
ICRMP's motion stating he would not, at any time in this litigation, argue ICRMP was not
obligated to defend its insured.

This stipulation is an unambiguous waiver of any

argument to the contrary. See TR12:7-13:7.
The importance of the summary judgment granted to ICRMP is the fact that it has
been judicially determined that the Kootenai County insureds were entitled to a defense
,"/,

-

~-'.'

under the ICRMP policy. The District Court erred by failing to consider the impact of this
ruling in light of the language in the Northfield policy. Under the express terms of its own
policy, Northfield was required to indemnify its assured, ICRMP, "for all sums, including
expenses, ... which the assured [ICRMP] became legally obligated to pay ... ". R219,
Exhibit 4 (Martens Affidavit, Exhibit A, p. 13, 1]A). As recognized by the District Court's
Order, ICRMP was legally obligated, pursuant to the terms of the insurance policy it sold
to the Kootenai County insureds, to provide a defense in the Paradis litigation. Because
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ICRMP was legally obligated to provide that defense, Northfield's obligation to indemnify
ICRMP was triggered.
The District Court's erroneous conclusion that an occurrence did not take place
during the time ICRMP was reinsured by Northfield is inconsistent with its Order granting
ICRMP's Partial Motion for Summary Judgment. This is revealed by the fact the term
"occurrence" is defined in both the ICRMP and Northfield policies. The definitions in the
two policies are, for all practical purposes, identical. Coverage could not have existed
under the ICRMP policy unless the Paradis liability complaints alleged a "personal
injury" arising out of an "occurrence" took place during the policy period. Because the
District Court issued a ruling establishing ICRMP was legally obligated to defend its
insureds, its ruling that Northland was not obligated to indemnify ICRMP for the costs
associated with that defense is clearly erroneous and should be reversed.
Even in the absence of the Order granting ICRMP's Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment, the record before this Court reveals that the District Court erroneously
concluded that the alleged claims of Mr. Paradis were all proximately caused by the
alleged failure of Kootenai County to train its employees regarding their obligation to
disclose exculpatory evidence as required by Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
The District Court's error was its failure to recognize the Paradis complaints alleged torts
that were separate and distinct from the alleged failure to disclose exculpatory evidence.
The District Court also failed to consider the fact the Paradis complaints alleged the
ICRMP insureds had continued to engage in tortuous activities after he was convicted
and continued to violate his civil rights throughout the 1980's and 1990's during the time
Kootenai County was insured by ICRMP and during the time ICRMP was reinsured by
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Northland.5 For purposes ofdetermining of whether a duty to defend arose, the District
Court should have examined the Paradis complaints to determine whether the
allegations described tortuous activity which took place from 1985 through 2001. Those
allegations should have been read broadly to determine whether they could possibly
describe a covered claim. See Hoyle, 137 Idaho at 372-374. As indicated above, the
District Court made no attempt to engage in this analysis. A review of the Paradis
complaints reveals that potentially covered claims are described which, in turn, triggered
ICRMP's obligation to provide a defense.

1.

Independent Torts Alleged in Paradis Complaints.

The Paradis Complaint alleges that ICRMP's insured, Haws, made untrue
statements to the press. Id. (McHenry Affidavit, Exhibit 2; Complaint, 1111120 through
122). These allegations are alleged to have occurred after Paradis was convicted and
was incarcerated for the Palmer murder. They were described by Judge Winmill in the
liability litigation as separate discrete acts that were separate from the prosecution and
conviction. Id. (McHenry Affidavit, Exhibit 4, p. 40). These allegations fall within the
definition of "personal injury" under the ICRMP and Northfield policies. See R219,
·,,,"/

Exhibit 1, Exhibit 4; (McHenry Affidavit, 119, Exhibit 1, p. 15), Martens Affidavit, Exhibit A,
p. 14, 111.
In the Amended Complaint, Paradis also alleges that while he was in prison,
Haws made a conscious decision to continue to conceal evidence while Paradis was

5 According to ICRMP, from the time of its inception in 1985 through 2001, Kootenai
has, continuously, been its insured. During the same timeframe, ICRMP purchased
reinsurance from Northland and its subsidiaries. See R219, Exhibit 12 (Ferguson
Affidavit, 112). Northland does not deny that at least during a portion of this time, it sold
insurance to ICRMP. According to Northland, its records indicate policies were sold to
APPELLANT IDAHO COUNTIES RISK MANAGEMENT PROGRAM UNDERWRITER'S
OPENING BRIEF - 26

attempting to challenge his conviction through the appellate and habeas corpus litigation.

See R219, Exhibit 2 (McHenry Affidavit, Exhibit 5; Amended Complaint, Count X, '11188).

At Count IX of the Amended Complaint, Paradis alleged that Haws made a series
of false statements concerning him which began in 1986 and 1987 and continued until
his release from prison. See R219, Exhibit 2 (McHenry Affidavit, Exhibit 5; Amended
Complaint, '1!'11174 through 180). These allegations, and particularly the allegations in
Count IX, unambiguously describe alleged torts which are independent from the ICRMP
insureds' obligation to make appropriate Brady disclosures. As outlined above, both the
ICRMP and the Northfield polices, through their definitions of personal injury, extend
coverage for claims involving libel, slander, or defamation of character. See R219,
Exhibit 2, Exhibit 4 (McHenry Affidavit, Exhibit 1, p. 15, '119; Martens Affidavit, Exhibit A,
p. 14, '111 ). This is but one example of the District Court's erroneous analysis of ICRMP's
obligation to defend. The allegations in Count IX of the Amended Complaint described a
potentially covered claim which occurred in 1986 through 2001. This is the timeframe
when Kootenai County was an ICRMP insured and ICRMP was purchasing reinsurance
from Northland.

2.

Continuing Torts Alleged in Paradis Complaints.

The first Complaint in the Paradis litigation was filed April 9, 2003. See R16-45.
At Count I, Paradis alleged civil rights violations by Kootenai County and former
prosecutor Glen Walker. See R29-32 (Paradis Complaint, '11'1162-71). According to the
Complaint, Kootenai County and the prosecutor's office violated their duties to disclose

ICRMP in 1986-1988 and from 1994-2001. R219, Exhibit4 (Martins Affidavit, '112).
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exculpatory evidence in connection with his criminal prosecution. Paradis specifically
alleged the defendants' legal duty to disclose evidence arose in 1980 and 1981, and
then continued for many years thereafter. This factual allegation is found at ,J68 of the
Complaint and reads:
68. Despite the requirements of the Brady doctrine and the
known implications of such requirements affecting the rights
of criminal defendants and the duties and activities of law
enforcement personnel, in 1980 and 981 - and indeed continuing for years thereafter - the customs, policies and
practices of Kootenai County, particularly those of its
prosecuting attorney and sheriff, displayed and reflected a
deliberate indifference to and conscious disregard for the
constitutional rights of criminal defendants generally, and the
plaintiff in particular.
(emphasis added) R31.
At Counts IV and V, Paradis alleged negligence, false arrest, malicious
prosecution, and false imprisonment against Kootenai County and its agents, including
defendants Walker, Haws, Erbland, and Elliott.

In describing these torts, Paradis

realleged and incorporated the allegations in Count I, which described continuous
tortuous activity occurring for years after his arrest and conviction. See R37 (Complaint,
.'jj88); R31 (Paradis Complaint, ,J68). Finally, at Counts IX, X, and XI, Paradis alleged
negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress and defamation against
defendant Haws. The Complaint specifically alleged that after Paradis was incarcerated,
Mr. Haws made a negligent choice of continued secrecy concerning the disclosure of
evidence which Paradis contended was exculpatory and which should have been
produced. See R42 (Paradis Complaint, ,J118).
The Amended Complaint was filed June 6, 2005. See R219, Exhibit 2. (McHenry
Affidavit, Exhibit 5). Count I alleged civil rights violations against prosecutor Walker and
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Kootenai County surrounding the alleged failure to train county employees under the

Brady v. Maryland doctrine. Id. (McHenry Affidavit, Exhibit 5, 111190 through 101).
These allegations were described as continuing torts at 1192 which read:
92. The duty to disclose and the duty to train in the
requirements of disclosing exculpatory evidence to criminal
convicts under Brady is a continuing duty and does not
cease with the conviction and incarceration of the criminal
defendant. (emphasis added)
The Complaint went on to allege this continuing duty was violated throughout Mr.
Paradis' incarceration as follows:
97. Despite the requirements of the Brady doctrine and the
known implications of such requirements affecting the rights
of criminal defendants and the duties and activities of law
enforcement personnel, in 1980 and 1981 - and indeed continuing for years thereafter - the customs, policies of
Kootenai County, particularly its prosecuting attorney and
sheriff, displayed a reflected and deliberate indifference to
and conscious disregard for the constitutional rights of
criminal defendants generally, and the plaintiff in particular.
(emphasis added)
Id. (McHenry Affidavit, Exhibit 5, 1197, emphasis added).

Paradis then alleged the county's failure to train or supervise its employees continued
thro:Jghout his incarceration causing him to suffer physical deterioratiorl';'injuiy/and ~
emotional distress. Id. (McHenry Affidavit, Exhibit 5, 11101).
At Count VII of the Amended Complaint, Paradis sought relief under theories of
negligent training and supervision under state law against prosecutor Walker and
Kootenai County. This section realleged and incorporated the earlier allegations in
Counts I, II, and 111, R219, Exhibit 2 (McHenry Affidavit, Exhibit 5, p. 31).

By

incorporating the allegations in 111192, 97, and 98, Paradis alleged that under state tort
law, the defendants were charged with a continuing legal duty to train and supervise its
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employees and agents not only during the time of his initial arrest and prosecution, but
during the years after he was convicted and was allegedly wrongfully imprisoned.
Paradis was describing tortuous activity he contended was ongoing throughout his
incarceration which he contended continued until he was released from prison.
According to Paradis, his civil rights were violated when Kootenai County failed to
disclose exculpatory evidence which resulted in his wrongful conviction. He contended
this duty was breached and that Kootenai County's tortuous activities continued for many
years thereafter.

See R31 (Complaint, 1168); see also R219, Exhibit 2 (McHenry

Affidavit, Exhibit 5, 1197). He does not allege how many years the ICRMP insureds
continued to engage in activities that breached this duty. Reading this allegation broadly
as required by Kootenai County v. Western Casualty & Ins. Co. and Hoyle v. Utica
Mut. Ins. Co., leads to the conclusion that Paradis was alleging continuous tortuous

activity throughout his 20 plus years of incarceration which did not end until his release
from prison. Paradis also alleged Kootenai County was negligent in the enforcement of
its own policies dealing with the disclosure of exculpatory evidence by police and
prosecutors. See R31 (Complaint, 1169), see also R219 (McHenry Affidavit1 Exhibit 5,
111197 through 101 ). He further alleges that he was subjected to negligent and false
imprisonment by all of the defendants at Counts IV and V of the Amended Complaint.
False imprisonment describes tortuous activity which begins at the time a plaintiff is
initially incarcerated and continues until their release. See Pete v. Metcalf, 8 F3d. 214
(5 th Cir. 1993); O'Fallen v. City of Burlington, 427 NW3d. 809 (N.D. 1988); Alder v.
Beverly Hills Hosp., 594 SW2d. 153 (Tex. Civ. App. 1980). The ICRMP and Northfield

policies, through their definitions of personal injury extend coverage for allegations of
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false arrest and false imprisonment. See R219, Exhibit 2, (McHenry Affidavit, ,T9, Exhibit
1, p. 15); Exhibit 4, (Martens Affidavit, Exhibit A, p. 14, ,T1).
Finally, Counts IX, X, and XI of the original Complaint alleges negligence on the
part of ICRMP insured Haws surrounding his alleged failure to disclose exculpatory
evidence. See R41-43 (Complaint, ,T,T112 through 124). According to the Complaint,
Haws' tortuous activities continued for years after Paradis was incarcerated.

Id.

(Complaint ,T,T113-114, 118 and 119) Again, these allegations must be read broadly as
describing continuous tortuous activity up to the time Paradis was released from prison.
Contrary to the conclusions of the District Court, a continuing tort, by definition,
involves a series of acts over time that causes personal injury, including emotional
distress. See Curtis v. Firth, 123 598, 850 P2d. 749 (1993). It is undisputed, based
upon the rulings of Judge Win mill in the Paradis litigation, the liability complaints alleged
continuing torts. R219, Exhibit 2 (McHenry Affidavit, Exhibit 4, pp. 44-45). The District
Court erred by failing to consider whether the existence of a continuing tort triggered
potential coverage under the ICRMP and Northfield policies if the tort was ongoing
during the time Kootenai County was insured by ICRMP. It is ICRMP's position the
~

~

.

definition of "occurrence" in both the ICRMP and Northfield policies extends coverage for
continuing torts.

3.

Continuing Torts Are "Occurrences" As Defined in the
ICRMP and Northfield Policies.

The Northfield and ICRMP policies both define the term "occurrence" in a manner
which would include continuing torts. Both definitions extend coverage for a "continuous
or repeated exposure to conditions which result in personal injury". R219, Exhibit 2;
Exhibit 4 (McHenry Affidavit, Exhibit 1, p. 14, ,T8); (Martens Affidavit, Exhibit A, p. 6).
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In Keene Corp. v. Ins. Co. of North America, 667 F2d. 1034 (D.C. Cir. 1981)
cert denied 455 U.S. 1007 (1982), the court interpreted the term "occurrence" contained
in a casualty policy in the context of asbestos litigation. The court concluded that the
asbestos exposure and resultant disease contracted by the plaintiffs was a continuous
process which constituted a single occurrence triggering coverage on all liability policies
which were in place throughout the occurrence.

It must be noted the occurrence

encompassed many years. Id. at 1038. The court concluded that once the insurer's
policy was triggered, it was required to defend and indemnify its policyholder to the
extent of its entire policy limits, even though part of the injury may have occurred outside
its policy period. Id. at 1040-1041.
A similar analysis was utilized in Dioceses of Winona v. Interstate Fire & Cas.
th

Co., 89 F3d. 1386 (8 Cir. 1986) involving longstanding and repeated sexual abuse by a

pedophilic priest. The Dioceses was sued for its negligent supervision of the priest. The
abuse of the plaintiff began in October of 1979 and continued until February of 1987.
The court described the occurrence as "the continuous and repeated exposure of
Mrozka (liability plaintiff) to the negligent supervision of Father Adamson by both the
,·/

Dioceses and the Archdioceses. Because the negligent acts took place, at least in part
during the policy period causing the plaintiff to suffer injury, coverage existed.
The same analysis was utilized in Nat'/ Cas. Ins. Co. v. City of Mt. Vernon, 128
AD2d. 332, 515 NYS2d. 267 (1987) involving a claim for false imprisonment where the
plaintiff was wrongfully incarcerated for two years.

The insurer refused to defend

arguing the arrest occurred before the effective date of the policy. This argument was
rejected with the court writing:
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Contrary to National's contentions, the language of the
occurrence clause herein ascribes no temporal relevance to
the cause of the event preceding the covered injury, but
rather premised coverage exclusively upon the sustaining of
specified injuries during the. policy period. Thus, the
pertinent policy provision provides coverage for an
"occurrence" and, thereafter, states that an occurrence
means an event ... which results in personal injury ...
sustained during the policy period." (emphasis added).
Indeed, as one commentator has stated in discussing a
similar provision, "[the] policy will not depend upon the cause
of event of occurrence, but will be based upon the injuries or
damage which result from such an event and which happen
during the policy period. It will not be material whether the
cause of the event happened during "before the policy
period". Obriest, New Comprehensive Liability Insurance
Policy, General Liability Insurance: 1973 Revisions at
39; see also Appalachian Ins. Co. v. Liberty Mutual Ins.
Co., 676 F2d. 56, 61-62; Bartholomew v. Ins. Co. of North
America, 502 F. Supp. 246, 252 affirmed Bartholomew v.
Appalachian Ins. Co., 655 F2d. 27; American Motorist
Ins. Co. v. Squibb & Sons, Inc., 95 Misc2d. 222, Deodato
v. Hartford Ins. Co., 143 NJ Super 396, 363 A2d. 361
affirmed 154 NJ Super 263, 81 A2d. 354; Acorn Ponds v.
Hartford Ins. Co., 105 A2d. 723, 724; annotation 27 ALR4 th
382. We note, moreover, that there is nothing in the policy
which requires, as a prerequisite to ascertain whether there
is coverage, that the injury resulting from a causative event
be reduced to a single or fixed occurrence in time. Nor does
the policy distinguish, in terms of coverage, between
compensable injuries which are continuous in nature and
those whose occurrence is discrete ahtl noncontinuous or
requires that a personal injury take place in its entirety
during the policy period. These omissions are particularly
significant in that the policy specifically recognizes that an
injury can be caused by "continuous or repeated exposure to
conditions" (see Keene Corp. v. Ins. Co., 667 F2d. 1034,
1049 cert denied 455 U.S. 1007). Accordingly, the operating
event triggering the exposure and thus resulting in coverage
under the policy, is the sustaining of a specified injury during
the policy period.

See 515 NYS2d. at 270. See also O'Fallen v. City of Burlington, 427 NW2d. 809
(N.D. 1988).
These cases stand for the proposition that the term "occurrence" requires
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insurance companies to provide coverage for continuing torts. If the allegations in the
liability complaints describe insured activities taking place, during the policy period,
coverage arises. The definition of occurrence is consistent with this Court's description
of a continuous tort in Curtis v. Firth, 123 Idaho 598, 850 P2d. 749 (1993). In that case,
a continuing tort was described as " ... a series of acts over a period of time, rather than a
single act causing severe emotional distress." Id at 604. In the Paradis liability case,
the Honorable Lynn B. Winmill recognized the liability complaints described continuing
torts which did not accrue until after Mr. Paradis was released from prison. See R219,
Exhibit 2 (McHenry Affidavit, Exhibit 4, p. 42-44).
In light of the foregoing, contrary to the erroneous conclusion reached by the
District Court, the Paradis liability complaints clearly alleged a series of acts undertaken
by the ICRMP insureds which, according to Mr. Paradis, continued to violate his civil
rights and which also violated State law, all of which caused him to suffer emotional
distress during the time Kootenai County was insured by ICRMP. As noted by the courts
in Keene Corp. v. Ins. Co. of North America; Dioceses of Winona v. Interstate Fire

& Cas. Co.; and Nat'/ Casualty Ins. Co. v. City of Mt. Vernon, the coverage question
,r

- ~--:-.-

is whether the tortuous activity alleged in the liability complaint took place, at least in
part, during the time Kootenai County was insured by ICRMP and during the time ICRMP
purchased reinsurance from Northland. Based upon the allegations in Paradis liability
complaints, and as found by Judge Winmill in the Paradis litigation, it is undisputed that
continuous torts were alleged. Those allegations triggered ICRMP's duty to defend.
Northland recognized this fact when it stipulated to the entry of summary judgment in
favor of ICRMP determining that an obligation to defend existed under the ICRMP policy.

APPELLANT IDAHO COUNTIES RISK MANAGEMENT PROGRAM UNDERWRITER'S
OPENING BRIEF - 34

See TR12:8-13:7.

As stated above, the District Court failed to appreciate the

significance of this stipulation and the fact that Northland was required, under the terms
of the Northfield policy, to reimburse its assured once ICRMP became legally obligated
to provide a defense to the ICRMP insureds. The obligation to provide the defense
arose under the ICRMP policy, not the Northfield policy. For this reason, the District
Court's ruling granting Northland's Motion for Summary Judgment must be reversed.

D.

NORTHLAND CANNOT CONTEST THE PARADIS SETTLEMENT AFTER IT
BRACH ED ITS CONTRACT WITH ICRMP.
As outlined in the sections above, ICRMP, at all times, fulfilled its contractual

obligations to Northland as expressed in the Northfield reinsurance policy. Northland,
two years after the litigation was ongoing, breached the policy by taking the position that
coverage did not exist and, thereafter, refusing to reimburse ICRMP as required by the
Northfield policy and, further, refusing to be involved in the mediation which ultimately
resolved the Paradis lawsuit.
The impact of an insurer incorrectly refusing to provide coverage and breaching
the contract between itself and its insured was addressed in Exterovich v. Burress, 139
Idaho 439, 80 P3d. 1040 (2003) where this Court wrote: '"
A liability insurer such as ICRMP has two duties: the duty to
defend and the duty to indemnify. The duty to defend arises
upon the filing of a complaint containing allegations that, in
whole or in part read broadly, reveal a potential for liability
that would be covered by the insured's policy. Hoyle v.
Utica Mut. Ins. Co., 137 Idaho 367, 48 P3d. 1256 (2002). If
the insurer breaches its duty to defend and the insured
settles a claim covered by the policy, the insurer has a duty
to indemnify its insured for the amount of that settlement so
long as a potential liability for the insured existed which
resulted in a reasonable settlement in view of the size of
possible recovery and the probability of the claimant's
success against the insured. City of Idaho Falls v. Home
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Indemnity Co., 106 Idaho 604, 188 P2d. 383 (1995). An
insurer's duty to defend and indemnify are separate duties.
Id.

See 139 Idaho at 441.
In Exterovich, the court recognized an insurer may, after previously denying
coverage, assume its duty to defend. However, the insurer is bound by any admissions
made by the insured which were part of a reasonable settlement. Id. at 442. This
holding restated the court's prior ruling in City of Idaho Falls v. Home Indemnity Co.,
126 Idaho 604, 888 P2d. 383 (1995) where the court held that an insurer was not
entitled to relitigate an underlying action following a settlement where the insurer had
previously breached the contract between itself and its insured. Id. at 610.
In this case, Northland cannot relitigate or challenge the settlement which was
reached between ICRMP and Mr. Paradis. At the time of the mediation, Northland had
already breached the insurance policy between itself and ICRMP. Despite this, ICRMP
continued to keep Northland informed of the development of the litigation and invited its
participation in the mediation. See R067-68 (Complaint, Exhibit F); R219, Exhibit 12
(Ferguson Affidavit, 1)10). Northland ratified its prior breach by refusing to attend the
mediation and reaffirming its prior position that coverage did not exist. R71 (Complaint,
Exhibit G); R219, Exhibit 12 (Ferguson Affidavit, 1)10). Acting in the best interest of its
insureds, ICRMP entered into an extremely reasonable settlement in light of the multi
million dollar exposure facing its insureds. See R219, Exhibit 12 (Ferguson Affidavit,
1)12). In fact, ICRMP was able to resolve the case for less than its anticipated defense
costs through trial. Id. (Ferguson Affidavit, 1)1]9 and 11 ). These facts establish that as a
matter of law the Paradis settlement was reasonable and cannot, at this time, be
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challenged by Northland. Additionally, and more importantly, ICRMP was authorized by
the unambiguous terms of the Northfield policy to enter into reasonable settlements.
R219, Exhibit 4 (Martens Affidavit, Exhibit A, p. 5). Absent evidence indicating the
settlement was made in bad faith or was not reasonable, Northfield and Northland were
bound by ICRMP's decision. Northland was then obligated, pursuant to the express
terms of the Northfield policy, to reimburse ICRMP for expenses relating to the Paradis
settlement. The District Court failed to address the question of whether the Paradis
settlement was reasonable. As a matter of law, the record before this Court establishes
ICRMP's decision to pursue mediation and its ultimate decision to settle the case were
undertaken in good faith and were, at all times, reasonable. Northland is obligated
under the terms of the Northfield policy to reimburse ICRMP for those expenses.
Accordingly, the District Court's ruling that Northland is not required to fulfill its indemnity
obligations to its assured, ICRMP, should be reversed.

V.
CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the District Court's Memorandum Decision and
• .

,·1

~

Order granting Northland's Motion for Summary Judgment should be reversed.
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